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ABSTRACT
Spam messages are an increasing threat to mobile com-
munication. Several mitigation techniques have been pro-
posed, including white and black listing, challenge-response
and content-based filtering. However, none are perfect and
it makes sense to use a combination rather than just one.
We propose an anti-spam framework based on the hybrid of
content-based filtering and challenge-response. There is the
trade-offs between accuracy of anti-spam classifiers and the
communication overhead. Experimental results show how,
depending on the proportion of spam messages, different fil-
tering parameters should be set.
Keywords
Anti-spam filtering, a threshold sensitivity problem, Uncer-
tain area in decision, Human Interaction
1. INTRODUCTION
Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging
Service (MMS) are a popular means of mobile communica-
tion. Texting costs have decreased continuously over the
years (to an extent of free texting) whereas the bandwidth
for communication has increased dramatically. Such trends
have attracted a large number phishing and spamming at-
tacks using text messages. In particular, spam messages con-
taining pornographic or promotive materials are an emerg-
ing phenomenon, and they have caused a significant level of
inconvenience for users. These are now prevalent in Korea,
Japan and China and prone to spread across countries where
mobile communication is popular. Statistics for 2008 show
that a user in China, on average, receives 8.29 SMS spam
per week [1].
Much of the existing research into anti-spam solutions,
however, has focused on the protection of emails in the con-
text of the Internet. Some of the popular methods include
white and black listing, digital signature, postage control,
address management, collaborative and content-based filter-
ing [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Different characteristics between emails
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and text messages make it harder for one to apply such ap-
proaches directly in mobile networks and analyze the re-
sults. Each approach has its own set of drawbacks and does
not improve much if used alone. For example, the extra
traffic required to perform challenge-response needs to be
minimized (or needs to be compensated for) as it is more
expensive to use the bandwidth in mobile networks. This
issue is capable being addressed by content-based filtering:
obvious spam would be filtered first to reduce the number
of messages subject to challenge-response. In this paper, we
propose an anti-spam framework based on the combination
of these two methods. We attempt to reduce a great num-
ber of high-volume spamming, and as a result, minimize the
extra amount of bandwidth that would be required. Given
a reasonable filtering algorithm, we show that, ultimately,
less bandwidth (than freely allowing high-volume spam) will
be used with our method.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 3, we describe a hybrid spam filtering framework.
Section 4 evaluates the performance of our hybrid method
based on two measures, the traffic usage and the accuracy.
Finally, in Sections 5 we discuss the contribution of this
paper and the remaining work.
2. EXISTING SOLUTIONS
Content-based filtering solutions have been proved to be
effective against emails, which are typically larger in size
compared to text messages. Abbreviations and acronyms
are used more frequently in SMS and they increase the level
of ambiguity. [7] propose binary classification and filtering
methods for short messages in a Bayesian scheme. Classifi-
cation rules are defined and extended from general patterns
identified in past spam. However, adaptive schemes as such
are weak against innovative attacks where strategies con-
stantly evolve to manipulate classification rules. Filtering
alone will not be sufficient to detect spam.
Many anti-spam solutions [1, 8] have been suggested based
on a challenge-response protocol. A message sender needs
to verify that they are a legitimate sender by answering the
challenge message (e.g. through a web interface) before their
message is forwarded to the recipient. The sender authen-
ticates themselves as a human-user by answering a simple
turing test for which a machine cannot easily understand.
Nevertheless, the protocol has often been criticized for ex-
tra user interaction and traffic used. There might also be a
significant overhead in storing and managing challenge mes-
sages.
Our goal is to develop a solution that ultimately mini-
mizes the usage of network bandwidth by discouraging high-
volume spamming. We believe the extra traffic required to
perform challenge-response can be compensated if a large
amount of spamming attacks can be reduced as a result.
In our approach the challenge-response protocol classifies
machine-generated spam. We also use the filtering method
to reduce the number of messages that need to be verified.
Simulation results in later sections show that this hybrid ap-
proach is capable of controlling high-volume spam and the
traffic usage.
3. A HYBRID FRAMEWORK
Text messages are classified into three different regions
using a content-based filtering method: normal, uncertain
and spam. A filtering method cannot deal with uncertain
messages; therefore, we use a challenge-response protocol
to classify the uncertain messages into normal and spam
regions (see Fig. 1). We assume that the majority of spam
messages are generated by machines.
A human verification mechanism (in the form of challenge-
response) is added to a common filtering scheme to detect
whether an uncertain message falls into the normal or the
spam region. A message center (owned by an operator)
sends a challenge query to check if the sender is an indi-
vidual or a machine. The sender responds by answering the
query and the center compares the returned value against
the known correct value. If the values match, the message
is classified as normal, else, as spam. We are interested in
further classification of this uncertain region. A message
Figure 1: Hybrid Spam Filtering Overview
center is given the full responsibility of running the frame-
work due to the following reasons. Firstly, it should reduce
the traffic usage by filtering spam as early as possible, be-
fore forwarding them to the recipient. Secondly, using the
challenge-response protocol, the center will be able to col-
lect an enormous amount of sample data in real time; these
can be used to develop highly effective classifiers and con-
tinuously improve the performance of filtering algorithms.
Lastly, it would be difficult to install and maintain a homo-
geneous anti-spam software on all mobile devices; instead
we rely on one solution deployed in a message center.
3.1 Uncertain Region
If we assume there are only two regions, normal and spam,
a filtering method will use binary classification. Suppose
that we have a probabilistic model for the anti-spam clas-
sifier as a posterior distribution Pr(c = normal|y). This is
the probability that a message is normal: c and y denote
realization of random variables for a class and a message,
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Figure 2: (a) Two possible cases: h > h˜ (case 1)
and h < h˜ (case 2) for a given ground truth h˜ (red
dot line) and (b) Modified classification embedding
uncertain area given a ground truth h˜ (red dot line)
respectively. The odd ratio of the posterior is used to ob-
tain a measurable classification by Opost =
Pr(c=normal|y)
Pr(c=spam|y)
.
If Opost > 1, a message is classified as normal; otherwise, as
spam. Alternatively, we can simply use a threshold based
approach in the posterior distribution. If Pr(c = normal |y)
is close to one, a message is likely to be normal; if close to
zero, it is likely to be spam. Let c¯ = f(y, h) be a spam
filter where c¯ and h are an output and a given threshold,
respectively. This filter would work with the following rules:
c¯ = f(y, h) =

normal if Pr(c = normal|y) ≥ h
spam if Pr(c = normal|y) < h
(1)
This separates normal messages from spam (odd ratio ap-
proach is a special case where h = 0.5). The main problem
with this approach is finding a proper threshold; because
the threshold for ground truth h˜ is unknown, there are two
possible cases as shown in Fig. 2. If h is higher than h˜,
some of the normal messages in region A may be classified
as spam. If h is lower than h˜, some of the spam in region
B may bypass the filter and reach the recipients. Such a
threshold problem will always be present in classification: it
is almost impossible to find the underlying h˜; and anti-spam
software companies are likely to use strategies based on their
own experiences. The sensitivity problem can be resolved
by introducing an uncertain region with two thresholds (see
Fig. 2-b). These can be implemented as the upper and
lower boundaries of a traditional threshold system. There
are three labels: spam, uncertain area, and normal; we focus
on the uncertain area. Spam and normal regions are classi-
fied as in the traditional system. Only the messages that fall
into the uncertain area are checked using challenge-response.
In the next section we describe the protocols in detail.
3.2 Challenge-Response Protocols
We assume that there is a turing test available with a low
probability of producing false positives and negatives. Com-
pletely Automatic Public Test to tell Computer and Humans
Apart (CAPTCHA) is a commonly used one: it generates
pattern matching problems for which a human can easily rec-
ognize and a machine cannot. An automated program that
generates thousands of spam messages will not be capable of
answering a CAPTCHA based challenge, which might be a
graphical image containing a faint typeface. If the response
is correct, there is a high probability that the sender is a
human. A CAPTCHA can be designed in a flexible manner
using different media forms such as an image, an audio file
and a text [9]. Their implementation details are beyond the
scope of this paper.
A number of challenge-response protocols have already
been proposed [1, 8]. However, these focus only on the im-
plementation issues without considering the security model
and the cryptographic details. This section defines our se-
curity models and describes a number of possible protocols
in line with them. There are several issues we need to con-
sider before designing the protocols. Firstly, in dealing with
spam, message authentication and integrity are important;
whereas, confidentiality is not. Secondly, text messages are
usually unencrypted and unsigned; it is possible to tamper
with them during transmission. Thirdly, security properties
of the communication channel between a message center and
a sender need to be defined; this channel might or might not
be an authenticated one. Lastly, management of the ses-
sion information between all trusted pairs while performing
challenge-response, would impose a huge storage overhead
on a message center; there might be more than one mes-
sage center sharing this information; and it might or might
not be stored in the center. Mindful of these security and
scalability issues, we propose four different protocols: pro-
tocols 3 and 4 have been designed with the assumption of
an authenticated channel, and protocols 1 and 2 have not;
moreover, protocols 1 and 3 assume that a message center
manages the session information, and the others do not.
3.2.1 Notations
The symbols S and R represent a sender and a recipi-
ent, respectively. M represents a mobile message center,
T a timestamp, N a nonce, K a key and K−1 its inverse.
In a symmetric crypto-system such as AES, K and K−1
are always equal. We use {P}K for a plain text message
P encrypted with K. H is a one-way hash function. The
subscript m in Km implies that Km is M ’s public key. In
addition, ms in Kms shows that Kms is intended for com-
munication between M and S.
A sender’s ability to respond to a challenge depends on
knowing and interpreting a key, Kc
−1. A non-authorized
sender (e.g. a program sending spam) will not be able to in-
terpret and gain information about Kc
−1; this key serves to
identify machine-generated spam. For simplicity, encryption
algorithms are not considered in our protocols.
3.2.2 Protocols
In protocol 1, the message center, M , maintains the ses-
sion information.
[Protocol 1]
(M1) S −→ M : S,R, P
(M2) M −→ S : M,S, {Kms}Kc , {H(S,R, P ), N}Kms
(M3) S −→ M : S,M, {H(S,R, P ),N + 1}Kms
Before sending message 1, S stores R and P to prevent
message modification attacks. After receiving message 1, M
generatesKms and stores (S,R, P,Kms, N) as the session in-
formation. Kms is protected withKc. An image CAPTCHA
would be one way of protecting Kms against spam pro-
grams. After receiving message 2, S decrypts {Kms}Kc by
answering the challenge (their ability to interpret Kc
−1). S
then decrypts H(S,R,P ) and N using Kms. S compares
H(S,R,P ) against the previously stored values. S termi-
nates the protocol if these values do not match; otherwise,
S generates {H(S,R,P ), N+1}Kms by Kms and sends it to
M . After receiving message 3, M verifies {H(S,R,P ), N +
1}Kms . If it is valid,M forwards the stored message (S,R, P )
to R. Finally, M deletes the session information.
Users will be frustrated if challenge-response happens too
often. We use a timestamp, T , to solve this problem. Af-
ter receiving message 3, M maintains a session information
(S,R, P,Kms, T ) between S and R for a given time interval.
M checks the validity of Kms using the session information
and a policy that defines the lifetime of Kms.
The main drawback of this protocol is thatM has to bear
the huge overhead of maintaining the session information.
We describe another protocol which solves this issue by us-
ing authorized tokens instead:
[Protocol 2]
(M1) S −→M : S,R, P
(M2) M −→ S : M,S, {Kms}Kc , {H(S,R, P )}Kms ,
{Kms,H(S,R), T}Km−1
(M3) S −→M : S,R, {P}Kms , {Kms,H(S,R), T}Km−1
The key difference is the use of {Kms, H(S,R), T}Km−1 (which
can only be generated by M) as the authorization token for
verifying a response. M checks whether S is authorized by
looking at {Kms,H(S,R), T}Km−1 . Using this token, S can
just send message 3 alone, including a new text (P ′), within
the lifetime of T :
(M1) S −→M : S,R, {P ′}Kms , {Kms,H(S,R), T}Km−1
In these protocols, however, S cannot find out where the
challenge comes from. In an attempt to solve this problem,
we assume there is an authenticated channel between M to
S, and M ’s public key Km is securely installed in a mobile
device owned by S; perhaps during the process of manufac-
turing. We describe the following two protocols based on
these assumptions:
[Protocol 3]
(M1) S −→M : S,R, P
(M2) M −→ S : M,S, {{Kms}Kc , N}Km−1
(M3) S −→M : S,R, {N + 1}Kms
In protocol 3, M maintains the session information,
(S,R, P,Kms, N). When message 2 arrives, S verifies
the signature on {{Kms}Kc , N}Km−1 . S does not
respond if the signature is unknown.
[Protocol 4]
(M1) S −→M : S,R, P
(M2) M −→ S : M,S, {{Kms}Kc , H(S,R), T}Km−1 ,
{P}Km−1
(M3) S −→M : S,R, {P}Kms ,
{{Kms}KC , H(S,R), T}Km−1
Protocol 4 uses {{Kms}KC ,H(S,R), T}Km−1 as the autho-
rized token. Our protocols are likely to be compatible with
existing devices since the majority already have built-in en-
cryption and hash functions.
3.3 Observations
3.3.1 Upgrading Protocols
A message is always sent to the message center of the con-
tracted operator first. If the message is directed at someone
contracted to a different operator, it is forwarded to another
message center before reaching the receiver’s handset [10].
This means if one of the message centers decides not to use
our framework, all uncertain texts delivered via that cen-
ter would bypass the spam filter. It would be the weakest
point (and the only route needed) for an attack. Hence,
all existing message centers would have to support the new
protocol. While this is a large change and a challenging
one, operator-sponsored forums like OMTP (Open Mobile
Terminal Platform), are working with key mobile operators
to unify and recommend mobile terminal requirements [11].
With the increasing number of spam texts, it seems likely
that the ability to filter machine-generated uncertain texts
will persuade operators into upgrading their systems.
3.3.2 Performance
If there are too many messages subject to challenge-response,
its overhead will dominate; for example, sending an image
CAPTCHA is a huge overhead to authenticate a 100 char-
acter text message. Future work may look at adding a ‘by-
pass’ to the hybrid: for example, if a message begins with a
user-settable password (typically the recipient’s name, but
changeable), then it should be automatically treated as nor-
mal. As the uncertain region becomes smaller, we expect
the performance of our framework to improve.
3.3.3 Usability Issues
Adapting CAPTCHA methods will have implications on
the usability. A device might not have the capability to dis-
play an image CAPTCHA to a readable standard; also a mo-
bile user might find it difficult to verify an audio CAPTCHA
due to the background noise. These issues however, are
likely to be resolved with technological advances. According
to the Kelsey Group’s second annual study on mobile use,
more users than ever own internet-enabled smartphones:
phones which provide advanced information accessing func-
tions.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Description of Datasets
In order to measure the performance of our framework,
we have generated synthetic datasets. Suppose that there
are N number of sent messages (we set N = 5000). We
will use p and q to show the normal to spam proportion
where p + q = 1, and p and q are non-negative numbers
(in reality, there would be many operators with different
proportions). Let κ be a random variable generated from
an existing filtering method: κ = Pr(c = normal|y). For an
artificial dataset, we build a mixture model given by
p(κ|λ) = p(κ|c = normal, λ)p(c = normal|λ)
+p(κ|c = spam,λ)p(c = spam|λ) (2)
where λ denotes a set of hyper-parameters which control
parameters. We assume ci is generated from binomial dis-
tribution with hyper-parameters p and q. Thus, we have:
c ∼ p(c|λ) = Pr(c|1, p) = pc(1− p)1−c = pcq1−c
After classifying the ith sample message, we generate the
expected probability (this is the filtering output):
κ ∼ p(κ|c, λ) =

p(κ|c = normal, λ) = B(κ;α1, β1)
p(κ|c = spam,λ) = B(κ;α0, β0)
Here, B represents beta distribution and its hyper-parameters
are set as follows: α0 = 3, β0 = 5, α1 = 5, β1 = 2. Both
thresholds (h1 and h2) vary between 0 and 1 by 1/30.
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Figure 3: Displaying κ = Pr(c = normal|y) for N mes-
sages: spam (14.57%) and normal (85.32%)
We have built an artificial dataset based on a Spanish
database [7] which shows the proportion of spam as 14.57%
and normal as 85.32%; that is, q = 0.1457 and p = 0.8532.
The generated data have been plotted in Fig. 3-(a). A red
cross represents normal message and a blue circle represents
spam. This colouring scheme is also used in Fig. 3-(b).
The graphs show that there are a lot of overlapping labels
between 0.2 and 0.8. This overlapping section is considered
as the uncertain region. Note that the challenge-response is
not perfect and some of the spammight bypass the filter with
correct responses, and normal messages might be filtered
with incorrect ones. To model this imperfection, we use e1
and e2 to represent the ratios of False Positives (FP) and
False Negatives (FN) in the uncertain region.
4.2 Traffic Usage Comparison
We have simulated and analyzed the traffic usage using the
variable thresholds. Our framework considers three major
stakeholders (see Fig. 1): a message sender (A), a message
center (B), and a receiver (C).
First, we calculate the traffic used by an existing filter-
ing method. Only the messages with filtering probabilities
higher than the threshold h reach C via B; other messages
are deleted at B (only A to B). Suppose that yhc¯=type for
type ∈ {normal, spam} denotes all messages filtered as type
in terms of h, the total amount of traffic used is the sum
of |yhc¯=normal| × 2, and |y
h
c¯=spam| × 1 where | · | represents
the cardinality of a set: NFilteringOnly = |y
h
c¯=normal| ×
2 + |yhc¯=spam| × 1. This is because a normal message has
two paths (A→B and B→C) but spam only has one path
(A→B). In contrast, our hybrid model divides the mea-
Figure 4: Four possible pathways for the hybrid
method
surable space into three different areas using two thresh-
olds: h1 and h2. As a result, we have two more parame-
ters to estimate: the traffic used by normal messages (Nun)
and spam (Nus) in the uncertain region. Let yc˜=type for
type ∈ {normal, spam} be a set of messages that have label
type as a ground truth.
As Fig. 4 shows, there are four possible pathways. Firstly,
a message classified as normal using the higher threshold is
sent directly to C via B; the number of paths taken is two
(A→ B → C). Secondly, a message is in between the higher
and the lower thresholds; a correct response is submitted
by the sender and the message is classified as normal; the
number of paths taken is four (A → B → A → B → C).
Thirdly, a message is again in between two thresholds; this
time no response is returned and the message is classified
as spam; the number of paths taken is two (A → B →
A). Lastly, a message classified as spam using the lower
threshold is deleted at B; the number of paths taken is one
(A→ B).
The traffic usage is calculated using:
Nn = |y
h2
c¯=normal| × 2
Nun = |y
h1
c¯=normal ∩ y
h2
c¯=spam ∩ yc˜=normal| × (1− e1)× 4
+|yh1c¯=normal ∩ y
h2
c¯=spam ∩ yc˜=spam| × e2 × 4
Nus = |y
h1
c¯=normal ∩ y
h2
c¯=spam ∩ yc˜=spam| × (1− e2)× 2
+|yh1c¯=normal ∩ y
h2
c¯=spam ∩ yc˜=normal| × e1 × 2
Ns = |y
h1
c¯=spam| × 1
Nhybrid = Nn +Nun +Nus +Ns (3)
where e1 and e2 are the probability which normal people
cannot respond. Here, e1 and e2 are fixed to values 0.02 and
0.01 respectively.
Figures 5-(a) and 5-(b) show the inner sections of the
graph. The higher threshold is fixed to 0.73333, only the
lower threshold increases from 0 until it reaches this value.
The traffic is used less when the lower threshold increases.
We have also monitored the traffic usage with the lower
threshold fixed to = 0.1, and with the higher threshold in-
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Figure 5: Slides of an axis (with fixed threshold)
creased from this value to 1 (see Fig.5-a). The traffic us-
age does not change with the filtering approach because the
lower threshold is the same as h. As the number of messages
in the uncertain region increases so does the traffic usage.
4.3 Variant proportion of spam
We have fixed the proportion of spam to 14.57% and nor-
mal messages to 85.32%. In this section we show how the
performance is affected when these proportions change.
Table 1 describes a small number of samples from the
nine different proportions. Each record has six different
columns: proportion of spam (%), lower threshold (h1),
higher threshold (h2), traffic usage (TA) of Nhybrid, ratio“
=
Nhybrid
Nfilteringonly
”
, and accuracy
“
ACC = TP+TN
P+N
”
. It uses
three different measures for the performance. If the traffic
usage is less, we say the system is lighter and is more eco-
nomical. The ratio is only close to 1 if the traffic used in
the hybrid method is close to the amount used in the other.
The accuracy measures the correctness of message classifi-
cation. We can select practical threshold values for each
Table 1: Traffic amounts and accuracy of hybrid
methods in terms of thresholds
Proportion h1 h2 TA Ratio ACC
of spam
0.1 0.2 10218.8 1.0239 0.91847
0.1 0.9 27698.96 2.7754 0.98312
0.4 0.6 13563.78 1.4218 0.9526610%
0.8 0.9 10493.06 1.6081 0.39682
0.1 0.2 10450.56 1.0487 0.83314
0.1 0.9 27859.08 2.7957 0.98391
0.4 0.6 13561.34 1.4659 0.9415120%
0.8 0.9 10050.6 1.5731 0.46933
0.1 0.2 10662.46 1.0707 0.74703
0.1 0.9 28114.76 2.8233 0.98462
0.4 0.6 13682.54 1.5179 0.9421230%
0.8 0.9 9404.9 1.5167 0.53119
0.1 0.2 10915.14 1.0972 0.6635
0.1 0.9 28188.34 2.8336 0.9853
0.4 0.6 13717.14 1.5641 0.9329240%
0.8 0.9 8721.52 1.4442 0.59632
0.1 0.2 11139.94 1.1214 0.58259
0.1 0.9 28341.5 2.853 0.98627
0.4 0.6 13523.66 1.5946 0.9274850%
0.8 0.9 8182.46 1.3902 0.66251
spam proportion to compare the performance. For instance,
threshold values h1 = 0.1 and h2 = 0.2 can be selected
in 10% spam proportion to show a reasonable performance
of the hybrid method. However, if the system is concerned
with achieving high accuracy and not with reducing the traf-
fic usage, h1 = 0.1 and h2 = 0.9 values can be used. In a
spam-dominant environment (for spam proportion of 50%),
reasonable threshold values would be h1 = 0.4 and h2 = 0.6.
Returning back to the figures for a spam proportion of 10%,
h1 = 0.1 and h2 = 0.9 will be selected when accuracy is the
most significant factor.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a hybrid spam filtering framework for mobile
communication using a combination of content-based filter-
ing and challenge-response. A message that falls into the
uncertain region (after filtering), is further classified by send-
ing a challenge (e.g. an image CAPTCHA) to the sender: a
legitimate sender is likely to answer it correctly, whereas an
automated spam program is not. Challenge-response pro-
tocols have been designed with the necessary cryptographic
features. We have also shown the trade-offs between the ac-
curacy and the traffic usage in using our framework. The
simulation results suggest that, for a different level of spam
proportion, the practical thresholds should be carefully se-
lected according to the required level of the two measures.
In this paper, a synthetic dataset, as oppose to a real
dataset has been used due to the following three reasons:
firstly, we wanted to develop a generalized framework that
is flexible and applicable to a wide range of applications (e.g
VoIP spam filters[12]); secondly, it was not easy to find a real
dataset since the challenge-response protocol is not a com-
monly used filtering method; lastly, this protocol involves a
great level of human interaction and developing such a pro-
totype (in order to generate our own dataset) was outside
the scope. Our next step will be to contact mobile operators
and forums like OMTP to collect real data, and evaluate our
framework against other datasets.
Having the network operators charge for sending of text
messages has been one of the big inhibitors to the growth
of spam: even a cent per message might hugely alter the
economics of a spammer. Assuming that a reasonable filter-
ing method is in place, another hybrid potential is to force
spammers to opt into a charging scheme where the cost of
responding to a challenge is larger than sending an initial
spam. For example, imagine it costs two cents to send a
spam, then it would cost extra five cents to answer an im-
age CAPTCHA.
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